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THE OVER-PUNISHMENT PROBLEM AND THE COMMISSION'S
INDIFFERENCE To IT

Beginning in the 1970s, the United States embarked on a shift in its
penal policies, tripling the percentage of convicted felons sentenced to
confinement and doubling the length of their sentences.' This shift included a dramatic increase in the prosecution and incarceration of drug
offenders. 2 As a result of its move toward long prison sentences, the United
States now incarcerates so many people that it has become an outlier; this
is not just among developed democracies, but among all nations, including
highly punitive states such as Russia and South Africa,3 and also in comparison to the United States' own long-standing practices. 4 The present
rate of incarceration in the United States is currently "almost five times
higher than the historical norm prevailing throughout most of the twentieth century." 5 In sum, the United States has a serious over-punishment
problem. Our country's imprisonment rate has acquired the name, "mass
incarceration," meant to provoke shame about the fact that the world's
wealthiest democracy imprisons so many people, even at a time when
*
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crime rates have diminished and crime is "not one of the nation's pressing
social problems." 6
Most criminal justice scholars agree that our current prison population is too large.7 They also agree that the impact of imprisonment on the
crime rate is modest and that the speed at which people are released from
prison bears little relation to the likelihood that they will remain crime
free. 8 Many prisoners can serve shorter sentences without triggering an
increase in crime. As a result, we can reduce sentence lengths substantially
without adversely affecting public safety.9
Federal sentencing policy contributes significantly to the problem of
mass incarceration. Every year the federal government sets a new record
for the number of people locked up in federal prisons, which now stands at
approximately 218,000.10 Federal prisons are operating 38 percent overcapacity." While the state prison population recently declined for the first
time in almost forty years, the federal prison population continues to increase. 12 The unremitting growth of the federal prison population is a direct result of the Sentencing Reform Act ("SRA") of 1984, the United
States Sentencing Guidelines ("the guidelines") promulgated pursuant to
the SRA by the United States Sentencing Commission ("the Commission"), and statutes imposing mandatory rmrumum prison sentences for
many offenses, particularly drug offenses.
The guidelines were mandatory until the Supreme Court made them
advisory in United States v. Booker.'3 When the guidelines were mandatory,
they caused the average federal sentence to increase from twenty-eight to
fifty months.' 4 Although the Commission stated that it based the guidelines on past sentencing practice, its methodology immediately tilted
sentences higher.' 5 For many offenses, the Commission ignored past practice and, with little or no explanation, established much harsher
6.

Weisberg, supra note 3, at 1203.

7.

Clear & Austin, supra note 1, at 307-08.

8.

Id. at 309-11.

9.

Id.

10.

As of January 17, 2013, the exact figure was 217,937. See Weekly Population Report,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRIsONs, http://www.bop.gov/locations/weeklyjreport.jsp/pdf/fyl3bop-bf-justification.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2013).
FY 2013 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET:
(2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2013justification/
pdf/fyl3-bop-bf-justification.pdf.
11.
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E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
(2012) available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p11.pdf.
13.
14.
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543 U.S. 220 (2005).

Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Disparity: Not a Reason to Fix Booker, 18
REP. 160, 160 (2006).
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sentences. 16 And in all but a very small percentage of cases, it prohibited
courts from sentencing defendants to probation.' 7 To the extent that it
relied on past sentencing practice, the Commission calculated average preguideline sentences by counting only prison sentences, ignoring that "approximately 50 % of defendants in the pre[-]guideline era received
sentences of probation."' 8 Based on Congress's abolition of parole, another feature of the SRA, and the Commission's choices with respect to
the guidelines, the average time served by federal defendants rose from
thirteen months to forty-three months.' 9 One observer summarized the
result of the changes in federal penal policy as follows:
Changes in sentencing patterns over the past twenty years include a dramatic increase in the length of federal sentences, a
monumental shift towards incarceration and away from use of
straight probation, a dramatic increase in the size of the federal
prison population, and a significant increase in the proportion
of drug offenders, especially lower-level drug offenders, in the
federal system. This system loves punishment. 20
Reducing mass incarceration is conceptually simple: We need to send
fewer people to prison and for shorter lengths of time. 21 In addition, many
prisoners currently serving long sentences are elderly and present little risk
to public safety. 2 2 Establishing an early release program for such prisoners
would also contribute to reducing the number of people incarcerated.2 3
A reasonable observer might conclude from the foregoing that the
Commission, which has considerable authority with respect to federal sentencing policy, would be making an effort to address the problem of mass
incarceration. Such an observer would be surprised to discover not only
that the Commission has expressed little interest in the problem, but that it
recently asked Congress to enact legislation that would likely result in an
increase-not a decrease-in the federal prison population. 24 The Com16.
Id. at 578.
17.
Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Marvin Frankel's Mistakes and the Need to Rethink Federal Sentencin2, 13 BERKELEY J. CRiM. L. 239, 254 (2008).
18.
Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 15, at 578.
19.
Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 14, at 160.
20.
Marc L. Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. REv.
1211, 1212 (2004).
21.
Clear & Austin, supra note 1, at 316.
22.
ACLU, AT AMERICA'S EXPENSE: THE MASS INCARCERATION OF THE ELDERLY i-i
(2012), available at http://www.aclu.org/criminal-law-reform/report-americas-expense-massincarceration-elderly.
23.
See id. at viii.
24.
See Uncertainjustice: The Status of Federal Sentencing and the U.S. Sentencing Commission
Six Years After U.S. v. Booker: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland
Security of the H. Comm. on the judiciary, 112th Cong. 11 (2011) [hereinafter Uncertain Justice]
(statement of Patti B. Saris, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Commission).
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mission proposed a number of statutory changes all designed to make it
more difficult for judges to impose sentences below those called for by the
guidelines. Specifically, the Commission asked Congress to require judges
to give more weight to the guidelines and to provide additional reasons for
imposing sentences that vary substantially from the guidelines. 25 The
Commission also asked Congress to require courts of appeals to presume
that sentences within the guidelines are reasonable and to scrutinize more
carefully sentences based on disagreements with the guidelines. 2 6
The Commission justified its proposed changes on the ground that in
the wake of Booker, it had observed "troubling trends in sentencing, including growing disparities among circuits and districts and demographic
disparities." 27 In her statement to Congress, Commission Chair Patti B.
Saris made clear that what she meant by "troubling trends" was the fact
that judges were too often exercising the discretion that Booker conferred
on them to grant sentences below guideline sentences. Saris stated that
"[o]ver the last three years, average sentence lengths have decreased," and
that this was attributable "to a decrease in the rate at which courts are
imposing sentences within the applicable guideline range." 28 She asserted,
"The most notable change in federal sentencing over time involves the rate
of non-government sponsored below range sentences," which increased
from 12.5 percent of all cases in the year after Booker to "17.8 [percent] of
all cases in fiscal year 2010."29
It might seem odd that the Commission was more concerned about
judges imposing insufficiently harsh sentences than it was about mass incarceration. As I will discuss in Section IV, mass incarceration causes many
extremely serious problems, and while the modestly increased rate of below-guideline sentences between 2005 and 2010 is worth noting, it surely
falls many rungs beneath mass incarceration in overall importance. Further,
while reducing unwarranted disparities is one of the Commission's statutory duties,3 0 another is addressing the problem of excessive incarceration.
Congress directed the Commission to establish guidelines that minimize
the likelihood that the federal prison population will exceed capacity.3 '
However, from a historical perspective, the Commission's proposals
were unsurprising. The Commission was doing what it has been doing
since Congress created it: attempting to make it as difficult as possible for
judges to impose sentences below those called for by the guidelines. Fortu25.
Id. at 67.
26.
See Hector L. Ramos-Vega, Federal Sentencing Then, FederalSentencing Now: The United
States Sentencing Commission's Il-Advised Efforts to Fix Something That is Not Broken, FEDERAL
LAWYER, May 2012, at 4, 5, 17.
27.
Uncertainjustice, supra note 24, at 12.
28.
Id. at 33.
29.
Id. at 34.
30.
See 28 U.S.C. § 994(f (2006).
31.
See id. § 9 94(g).
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nately, the congressional subcommittee to which the Commission offered
its proposals seemed singularly uninterested in them. That the Commission
advanced the proposals at all, however, raises an important question about
the Commission itself. Now that the guidelines are advisory and judges are
free to reject them, it is unclear what role the Commission should play, if
indeed it serves any significant purpose at all.
In this Article, I attempt to address this question. I argue that the
Commission serves no useful purpose by continuing to seek ways of
preventing or dissuading judges from imposing below guideline sentences.
Rather, I suggest that the Commission ought to strike out in a new direction, one that is responsive to present conditions. The Commission should
focus on reducing mass incarceration. The Commission has considerable
resources and, if it made a serious and concentrated effort, could significantly ameliorate the problem of mass incarceration. At the same time, the
Commission could reduce the number of below guideline sentences. The
most effective way to reduce the number of below guideline sentences
would be to make the guidelines less severe. If judges were in greater
agreement with the guidelines, they would be less inclined to impose
sentences beneath them.
This Article proceeds as follows: in Section II, I briefly describe the
origins of the SRA, the Commission, and the guidelines. I focus on the
SRA's sponsors' concern with inter-judge sentencing disparity which occurs because not all judges impose equally severe sentences. I discuss how
this concern and the related effort to curtail judicial sentencing discretion
led to a sentencing regime of unredeemed harshness and thereby significantly contributed to mass incarceration. In Section III, I explain why attempting to build a sentencing system based on reducing inter-judge
disparity is doomed to fail. In Section IV, I discuss some of the terrible
consequences of mass incarceration, particularly in the African American
community, and suggest actions that the Commission could take to reduce
the over-punishment which causes it. In Section V, I suggest how the
Commission might refine its thinking about inter-judge disparity while at
the same time working to reduce mass incarceration.

II.

THE IDEAS AND POLICIES THAT LED

To

OVER-PUNISHMENT

The idea that inter-judge sentencing disparity should be reduced by
curtailing judicial discretion has played an enormously important role in
federal sentencing policy in the last forty years. Before the SRA was enacted and the guidelines promulgated, federal judges enjoyed broad sentencing discretion. 32 In the 1960s and 1970s, however, a group of legal
academics led by Marvin Frankel, a professor of administrative law who
had become a district court judge, concluded that judicial discretion
32.

KATE STITH &

Jost

A. CABRANES,

THE FEDERAL COURTS 104 (1998).

FEAR

OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN
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should be curtailed because it left too much room for the philosophies of
individual judges and led to the unequal treatment of similarly situated
defendants. 33
The reformers did not actually know very much about inter-judge
disparity. 3 4 They argued that such disparity was so great as to be "shameful," but the evidence did not support this claim.35 At most, there were
modest disparities.3 6 Nor did the reformers' sentencing egalitarianism go
very deep. Disparity in sentencing is caused not only by the fact that
judges have different sentencing philosophies but also by other factors, including differing prosecutorial practices and differing regional traditions.3 7
The reformers, however, expressed little interest in any source of disparity
other than judges. Further, the reformers never persuasively explained why
reducing inter-judge disparity was so important that it justified overturning law which had been on the books for many years and generally
thought to have worked well. 3 8 They also ignored the fact that it was virtually inevitable that curtailing judicial discretion would produce much
harsher sentences, as a commission chosen by elected officials is highly
likely to create severe penalties and because curtailing judicial discretion
essentially allows prosecutors to determine sentences based on their charging decisions. 3 9
The reformers were undeterred by the absence of evidence of widespread disparity, by the fact that sentencing decisions are often morally
difficult and not susceptible to fair resolution by means of a guideline, or
by the likelihood of harsher sentences. They took their proposal to Senator
Ted Kennedy which, for several reasons, was particularly unfortunate. 40
First, those seeking to improve the criminal justice system should hesitate
to take their ideas to Congress. In the United States, crime is a highly
politicized issue, and it is hard to pass a bill relating to crime without getting enmeshed in the politics of law and order. The SRA proved to be no
exception. Second, Kennedy wanted very badly to be thought of as effective and believed that he could earn this reputation if he could get a lot of
bills passed. This made him overly eager to sponsor so-called "reform" bills
and to accept harmful amendments to get them passed. Kennedy agreed to
sponsor a bill dramatically changing federal sentencing. As the bill
33.

See Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 17, at 240.
34.
Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 223, 228 n.23 (1993).
35.
STITH & CABRANES, supra note 32, at 106 (1998) (quoting S. REP. No. 98-225
(1983)).
36.

Id. at 106-07.

37.
Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28 Am.
CRIM. L. REv. 161, 200-03 (1991) (noting prosecutorial disparities and regional disparities).
38.

STITH & CABRANES,

39.

See JAMES Q.

40.

Stith & Koh, supra note 34, at 232-33.

supra note 32, at 35-37.

WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE

53-56 (2003).
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progressed, he accepted many harmful amendments, including one making
the proposed guidelines binding instead of advisory, such that the SRA
essentially became another "tough-on-crime" bill.4' By the time of passage, its most vocal supporter was President Reagan, who touted it as legislation that would "crack down on criminals." 4 2
Kennedy's bill also picked up support from legislators with long histories of opposition to civil rights, such as Senator Strom Thurmond of
South Carolina and Senator John McClellan of Arkansas. 43 These legislators clearly grasped that curtailing judicial discretion would lead to much
harsher sentences."4 Further, Kennedy's bill provided them with a vehicle
to strike out at one of their long-standing targets: the federal judiciary.
Southern conservatives had been hostile to federal judges since the 1950s
because of racially liberal decisions like Brown v. Board of Educatiotn,45 and
conservative hostility only increased as the Supreme Court announced
criminal law decisions like Miranda v. Arizona.46 And in the anti-disparity
rhetoric supplied by the reformers, conservatives found a new and more
acceptable, i.e., non-racial, language to express their disapproval of federal
judges. Their support for Kennedy's bill, however, had more to do with
hostility toward liberal judges than with concerns about sentencing
disparity.47
A few members of the House such as Representative John Conyers
of Michigan questioned the premise of Kennedy's bill, that the exercise of
discretion by federal judges had actually caused serious disparity, and that
whatever disparity it did cause justified radically curtailing judicial discretion. Conyers pointed out that "justice required 'leaving judges free to
tailor sentences to the unique circumstances involved in each case,'" and
that guidelines created by an administrative agency "would lead to 'an escalation' of sentences due to 'political pressure.' "48 Although history has
shown that Conyers was exactly right, a powerful alliance that included
Reagan, Kennedy, Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Joe Biden, and
most Republican legislators, rejected Conyers's view, and Kennedy's bill
became law. 4 9
41.

STITH & CABRANES, supra note 32, at 41.

42.

Id. at 46 (citing CONG. Q. 1841 (1984)).

43.

Id. at 42-43.

44.

Id. at 39-40.

45.
See Naomi Murakawa, The Racial Antecedents to Federal Sentencing Guidelines: How
CongressJudgedtheJudgesfrom Brown to Booker, 11 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. R-Ev. 473, 487-88
(2006).
46.

Id.

47.

See id. at 490-91.

48.

STITH & CABRANES,

(1984)).
49.

Id. at 47.

supra note 32, at 45-46 (quoting 130 CONG. REc. 2616
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Unsurprisingly, the Commission proceeded to promulgate guidelines
establishing very harsh sentences. Although Frankel had expressed hope
that the Commission would serve as a bulwark against harshness,5 0 this
hope was unrealistic and the Commission quickly dashed it. The Commission generally displayed a pro-prosecution bias, 5' and its members viewed
the Department of Justice and the most law-and-order members of Congress as their primary political constituency. 52 As judges began to impose
the sentences required by the guidelines, the federal prison population began to shoot up. In the pre-guideline era, judges imposed harsh sentences
only when they believed them necessary but, under the guidelines, harshness became "a rule of law." 53
As mentioned, the severity of the guidelines was not based on past
sentencing practice. The Commission had only the sketchiest data concerning past practice, and its unexplained decision to eliminate probation
sentences skewed the data that it did have. 54 Although most of the guidelines are severe, different guidelines followed different paths to severity. For
example, at the time that the Commission was formulating the guidelines,
Congress enacted the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 ("ADAA") which
established a three-tiered sentencing structure generally calling for
sentences of zero to twenty years, five to forty years, and ten years to life
depending on the type and amount of drug.55 Without explanation, the
Commission chose to structure the drug trafficking guideline based on the
quantities that the statute set. The result was "increased prison terms far
above what had been typical in past practice." 5 6 On the other hand, the
severity of the child pornography guideline developed over time, although, again, Congress contributed to it significantly. Congress issued a
series of directives causing the guideline to become particularly harsh. The
mean sentence for possession of child pornography increased from thirtysix to 110 months.57
50.
Marvin E. Frankel & Leonard Orland, A Conversation About Sentencing Commissions
and Guidelines, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 655, 672 (1993).
51.

Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REv. 715, 763-65 (2005).

52.
Michael Tonry, The Success ofJudge Frankel's Sentencing Commission, 64 U. COLo. L.
REv. 713, 717 (1993).
53.

Frankel & Orland, supra note 50, at 661.

54.

U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENC-

ING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENT,

bation a Real Option at Sentencing, 23
55.

(1987) 21-22; see also Ellen C. Brotman, Make ProREP. 257, 258 (2011).

FED. SENT'G

Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 15, at 582.

583 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES
(2004) [hereinafter FIFTEEN YEAR REPORT]). The time served by federal drug
offenders more than doubled following the enactment of the ADAA and the guidelines. FIFTEEN
YEAR REPORT at 53.
56.

Id.

at

SENTENCING 49

57.

United States v. Hanson, 561 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1009 (2008) (citing TROY STABE-

NOW,

DECONSTRUCTING THE MYTH OF CAREFUL STUDY: A PRIMER ON THE FLAWED PRO-

GRESSION OF THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY GUIDELINES).
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With respect to fraud and theft offenses, the Commission treated the
amount of loss as a proxy for seriousness. Thus, it created a guideline
driven almost completely by the amount of money stolen.58 Focusing on
amount, however, often leads to the unfair oversimplification of complicated facts. And in some white collar cases, such as those involving publicly
traded companies, the emphasis on amount causes the guideline range to
"run amok."5 9 In United States v. Adelson, for example, a defendant with
no criminal record and a history of good works faced a guideline calling
for life imprisonment. 60 Likewise, in United States v. Parris,the defendants,
first-time offenders, faced a guideline range of 360 months to life based on
"the 'kind of piling-on"' of points which is common under the
guidelines.6 1
To exacerbate the problem, over the last twenty years, the Commission has continually amended the guidelines to make them more severe. As
Professor Bowman put it, the guidelines have been subject to a "one-way
upward ratchet, in which sentences are raised easily and often and lowered
only rarely and with difficulty." 62 The result is a sentencing regime that
Professor Berman recently described as follows:
Severity is the issue . . . it's severity that is why the federal

system right now at this moment in time is so dysfunctional ...
the system has shown an incredible inability to deal with the
problem of severity effectively . . . everybody [including the

Justice Department] understands that in some of these cases, it's
too long .

.

. we can't go in there and ask for a guideline sen-

tence in front of judges, we'll look foolish. That must be because the guidelines are too severe, and it's foolish to assert in
some cases, that the guideline complies with the requirement of
3553(a) to impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than
necessary .6.. 63
Booker has created the potential to ameliorate the harshness of the
guidelines. 64 Yet the guidelines have strong gravitational pull as evidenced
by the fact that most sentences remain within or close to the guideline
58.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§

2B1.1 (2009).

59.
United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); see also United
States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 129 (2d Cir. 2006) ("Under the Guidelines, it may well be that
all but the most trivial frauds in publicly traded companies may trigger sentences amounting to
life imprisonment . . .").
60.

441 F. Supp. 2d at 509, 513.

61.

57 F. Supp. 2d 744, 745 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 510).

62.
Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural
Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1315 (2005).
63.
U.S. SENTENCING COMN'N, PUBLIC HEARING (2012) (testimony of Douglas A.
Berman at 285-89 (transcript on file with author)).
64.

See 543 U.S. 220.
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range.65 Judges are cautious by nature, and they pay a lot of attention to
the Commission's recommendations even though such attention is often
unwarranted. Thus, Booker has made a very severe sentencing regime only
slightly less severe.

III.

THE HARM CAUSED By THE COMMISSION'S PREOCCUPATION
WITH INTER-JUDGE SENTENCING DISPARITY
For a number of reasons, we have or should have learned from

twenty-five years of guideline sentencing that too much focus on reducing
inter-judge sentencing disparity is a major mistake. We have learned, for
example, that disparity is an elusive and complicated concept. 66 No two
defendants or offenses are identical, and the number of factors that may
appropriately affect a sentence is virtually unlimited, as are the weights that
may be properly placed on such factors. 6 7 Defendants who have committed similar offenses and have similar records may, yet, differ in important
ways. We also know that the guidelines frequently fail to capture these
differences. 68 The guidelines purport to treat like cases alike, but they
achieve this appearance "only by imposing artificial definitions of likeness .... "69 Further, it is often impossible to describe in a guideline how
much influence a fact or personal characteristic should have on a sentence. 7 0 This is the reason that in many kinds of cases, such as drug and
theft cases, the Commission placed so much emphasis on quantity. Focusing on the quantity of drugs possessed or money stolen makes guideline
writing easier even though the resulting guidelines do not help us impose
fair sentences. 7 1

We have also learned that binding or presumptively binding guidelines of the sort that the Commission has favored do not reduce certain
kinds of disparity. Binding guidelines made it impossible for judges to
check prosecutorial power and, thus, led to a huge increase in prosecutorcreated disparity. 7 2 Further, binding guidelines did not reduce racial disparity in sentencing. When the guidelines were mandatory, racial disparity
worsened. The Commission's Fifteen Year Report, the agency's evaluation
65.

Uncertainjustice, supra note 24, at 12.

66.

See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 32, at 106.

67.
See Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Fulfilling Booker's Promise, 11 ROGER WILLIAMS
U. L. REV. 521, 528-34 (2006) (discussing factors that sentencing judges consider in a postBooker landscape); see also R.A. Duff, Guidance and Guidelines, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1162,
1173-81 (2005) (explaining that numerical guidelines fail "to recognize the irreducible diversity
of values").
68.
Duff, supra note 68, at 1173.
69.
Id.
70.
Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: The Nonnative and EmpiricalFailure of the Federal Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REv. 85, 92-93 (2005).
71.
Id. at 93.
72.
Id. at 87.
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of fifteen years of guideline sentencing, discloses that the "gap between
White and minority offenders was relatively small in the preguidelines
era"; however, "[c]ontrary to what might be expected at the time of
guidelines implementation . .. the gap between African-American offenders and other groups began to widen." 73 Disparate treatment by judges
accounted for little if any of this disparity. The source of the problem was
the guidelines, in particular the career offender and drug guidelines. The
Report states:
Today's sentencing policies, crystalized into the sentencing
guidelines and mandatory minimum statutes, have a greater impact on Black offenders than did the factors taken into account
by judges in the discretionary system in place immediately prior
to guidelines implementation. Attention might fruitfully be
turned to asking whether these new policies are necessary to
achieve any legitimate purpose of sentencing.7 4
In other words, judges were better at treating offenders of different races
equally when there were no guidelines.75
Furthermore, we know that focusing on reducing inter-judge disparity produces very severe sentences. Although I have noted the guidelines'
harshness, one study deserves particular mention.7 6 Judge James S. Gwin, a
district court judge in the Northern District of Ohio, analyzed twentytwo cases in which juries returned guilty verdicts. In each case, after receiving the verdict, Gwin provided the jurors with the defendant's criminal record and asked each individual juror to recommend the appropriate
punishment without discussing the matter with the other jurors.7 7 Although the sample was not large, the jurors provided a reasonable indication of American sentiment as Ohio almost perfectly mirrors the United
States in age, employment levels, income, racial composition, and political
sentiment.7 8 The results were dramatic. The sentences called for by the
guidelines were far more severe than the sentences the jurors thought defendants should receive. 79 Depending on the case, the sentences specified
in the guidelines were three to five times harsher than the punishment the
jurors believed appropriate.so Thus, in a case where the guidelines recom73.

FIFTEEN YEAR REPORT, supra note 56, at 115.

74.

Id. at 135.

75.

See Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Rita, District Court Discretion, and Fairness in Federal
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mended a sentence of eight to nine years in prison, the jurors recommended a sentence in the vicinity of two to four years.
We have also learned that binding guidelines diminish public respect
for the judiciary. Frankel argued that curtailing discretion would create
confidence in the judicial system. 8' This, however, turned out not to be
true. By trivializing judges' powers, the pre-Booker guidelines created disrespect for federal sentencing. 82
We know, too, that defendants and their advocates have little use for
the Commission's continuing preoccupation with inter-judge disparity.
Frankel argued that curtailing discretion would benefit defendants by decreasing any resentment that they might feel as the result of receiving a
sentence that they regarded as overly severe and by giving them notice of
the penalties they faced.8 3 But no evidence supports Frankel's notion that
disparity causes prisoner resentment. 84 And while the guidelines provide
defendants with notice, they certainly do not benefit them. In fact, the
pre-Booker guidelines likely harmed defendants more than anything in the
history of federal criminal law.
At a forum on sentencing, Bobby Vassar, Minority Chief Counsel of
the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security of the
House Judiciary Committee, explained why defendants' advocates oppose
the Commission's focus on disparity. Responding to a statement by Commission Chair Saris that the Commission was concerned about judges
treating White defendants better than African Americans, Vassar said that
he was suspicious of the Commission's concerns about inter-judge disparity when the only solution it could ever come up with was more severe
sentences for all defendants. 85 Defendants do not care about disparity.
Rather, they are interested in receiving a sentence that they regard as fair,
which usually will be a sentence beneath the guidelines.
Unfortunately, even though the focus on inter-judge disparity has
caused great harm, the notion that such disparity is of great significance is
very hard to dispel. The Commission and others continue to treat the
degree of inter-judge disparity as the key measure of the performance of
the federal sentencing system. As former judge Nancy Gertner put it:
The Guidelines essentially supplanted everything. It was almost
as if we could no longer speak about anything else .... As one
judge in Oregon . . . describes it, "It's as if the only thing we
81.

Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 17, at 248-49.

82.

Id. at 250.

83.

Id. at 249.

84.

Id.

85.
American Constitution Society, The Relevancy & Reach of the U.S. Sentencing
Comm'n, YouTUBE (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y4GB98poYL4, at
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are talking about is whether I am doing the same thing as Judge
6
Adelman is doing, even if we are both wrong."8
Soon after Booker, I had an experience that illustrates the same point.
I imposed a substantially below-guideline sentence in an unlawful reentry
case, emphasizing the excessive severity of the sixteen-level guideline enhancement for reentry into the United States after conviction of an aggravated felony.87 As a subsidiary point, I noted the disparity in sentences in
unlawful reentry cases in districts that had "fast-track" programs and those
that did not.8 8 Many judges contacted me about the decision, but not a
single judge was interested in my critique of the severity of the sixteenlevel enhancement.8 9 They cared only about the point relating to
disparity. 90
In sum, we have learned or should have learned that, while the notion that it is important to reduce inter-judge disparity is seductive, such
importance has been greatly exaggerated. The truth is that paying too
much attention to reducing inter-judge disparity leads to very unsatisfactory results. As Professor Stith, coauthor of the most comprehensive study
of sentencing under the SRA, concluded: "[I]t is a major mistake to construct a system of guidelines whose primary structural objective is to minimize inter-judge sentencing disparity." 9 1

IV.

THE TERRIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF MASS INCARCERATION, AND
WHAT THE COMMISSION CAN Do ABOUT IT

Given the severity of the guidelines, if the Commission continues on
the path it has been on, focusing primarily on inter-judge disparity, it risks
becoming entirely irrelevant. A representative of the American Bar Association, James E. Felman, made this point at the Commission's February 16,
2012 hearing:
The data .

.

. is . . . startling . .. that roughly one-quarter of all

people imprisoned in the entire world are imprisoned here in
the United States. . . . [T]he incarceration explosion over the

last 40 years in this country is 'unmatched by any other society,
in any historical era.' I think that's a remarkable statement. No
society in history has done what we're doing now . .. there are
more people under correctional supervision in America than
86.

Panel Discussion, Federal Sentencing Under "Advisory Guidelines:" Observations by District
FopRDHAU L. REv. 1, 5, 7 (2006).
United States v. Galvez-Barrios, 355 F. Supp. 2d 958, 961-64 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
Id. at 963.
Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 17, at 256.
Id.
Panel Remarks, Is Guided Discretion Sufficient? Overview of State Sentencing Guidelines,
Louis U. L.J. 425, 447 (2000).
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87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
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were in the Gulag Archipelago under Stalin at the height and
there are more black men under correctional supervision that
there were slaves in 1850.
So to talk about the fact that the

. . .

rate of variances has

changed since Booker from 12.7 percent to 17.2 percent, a 4.5
percent change is - I am just struck that that type of relatively
insignificant change, when you consider the change in federal
sentence length has been an increase of 300 percent since the
guidelines were put into effect. That the percentage of probation - straight probation was between 35 and 40 percent when
the guidelines went into effect. It's now down to a little over
seven percent. Those are statistics that ought to motivate this
Commission to serious action. But to say that a four and a half
percent increase in the rate of non-government sponsored variances is an emergency that it calls for a full overhaul of the
system . . . it just feels a little more like we're rearranging the
deck chairs on the Titanic, as opposed to really addressing the
serious issues that confront our country in terms of sentencing
92
policy. . .
To play a useful role, the Commission must address the criminal justice system's main problem: too many prisoners resulting from too many
unnecessarily long sentences. The Commission has broad powers, and as
discussed, is authorized to address this problem.9 3 And as the nation's preeminent agency dealing with sentencing, by addressing it the Commission
92.
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, PUBLIC
at 381-83 (transcript on file with author)).
93.
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See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (2006).
The purposes of the United States Sentencing Commission are to - establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system that - assure
the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set forth in section 3553(a)(2) of title
18, United States Code; provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of
sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct while
maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing practices; and reflect, to the extent practicable,
advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice
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Id. While the Commission must reduce unwarranted disparity, it must also ensure that sentences
are sufficient but not greater than necessary, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006); make sure that the
guidelines do not produce more inmates than the prisons can handle, 18 U.S.C. § 994(g); and,
when appropriate, re-evaluate its work in light of feedback from participants in the system,
including judges.
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would set an important example and could have an impact at the state as
well as the federal level.
The Commission might begin by exploring some of the voluminous
literature on mass incarceration and its damaging effects. Many books and
articles have been written on the subject.9 4 Of particular importance is
Bruce Western's Punishment and Inequality in America, because it describes
the striking associations between mass incarceration and the problem of
increased inequality,9 5 which has become so serious that it can be reasonably regarded as a threat to our democracy. 96 We imprison the poor and the
uneducated at rates that are distressing even if we ignore race. But once we
consider race, the rates are truly horrific. 97 Problematically, the incarcerated population consists disproportionately of minorities. About 44 percent is African American, "more than three times" the 12 percent African
American share of the general population, and 19 percent is Hispanic,
compared to 12 percent of the general population.9 8 Incarceration has an
enormously harmful effect on the life prospects of those imprisoned. Released prisoners suffer a 30-40 percent loss of income, their domestic partnerships are often ruptured, and their marriage prospects reduced. 99 They
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suffer a profound social exclusion making it more likely that they will fall
into recidivism and reenter prison. 100
In addition, mass incarceration divides minority communities as the
experience of pervasive imprisonment is confined to those who do not
have a college education.o'0 Mass incarceration also disrupts inner city
neighborhoods and tears apart families living there. According to Western,
"By 2000, over a million black children-9 percent of those under eighteen-had a father in prison or jail."1 0 2 Young men grow up thinking
prison is a normal part of experience.1 0 3 In short, mass incarceration produces "a new and massive underclass, disproportionately made up of racial
minorities."1 04 As such, it is a major part of the story of increased inequality. 05 Western challenges any sense of self-congratulation about the success of the civil rights movement and the election of an African American
president. He makes clear that mass incarceration, although invisible to
many, is a form of residential segregation, and that "the invisibility of today's poor remains rooted in the physical and social distance between
white and blacks." 0 6
The Commission should proceed to hold public hearings on mass
incarceration. It should hold some of these hearings in the country's inner
cities so that it can obtain the perspective of those most affected by it.
Holding such hearings would also signal that the federal government has
an interest in the problem and would create greater awareness of mass incarceration among the many Americans who have not been exposed to it.
In order to reduce the federal prison population, the Commission
must also revise the guidelines to make them less severe. A good first step
would be to modify the guidelines to make clear that, if the facts of the
offense and the defendant's background warrant it, probation is an appropriate sentence. Section 3553(a) of Title 18 requires courts to impose the
least restrictive sentence that satisfies the purposes of sentencing. In many
cases, this will be a sentence of probation. 0 7 The guidelines, however, are
excessively oriented towards imprisonment and do not make this clear.
Further, section 3582(a) of Title 18 directs courts to consider the section
3553(a) factors "in determining whether to impose a term of imprisonment." Reasonably read, this provision means that the first question that a
100.

Id. at 1221.

101.
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102.
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103.
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sentencing court must ask is whether to imprison the defendant.1 0 8 This is
not, however, the first question that the guidelines ask, nor in most cases,
do the guidelines ask it at all. The question that the guidelines ask is what
imprisonment range does the defendant fall within. 09 The guidelines treat
probation as a footnote-an option available only in an extremely small
slice of cases.110 This approach has contributed to making prison the default sentence under the guidelines. To this day, the number of defendants
sentenced to probation without any form of incarceration is miniscule."
The Commission also needs to address the guideline relating to first
offenders. In 28 U.S.C. § 994(j), Congress directed the Commission to
"insure that the guidelines reflect the general appropriateness of imposing a
sentence other than imprisonment in cases in which the defendant is a first
offender who has not been convicted of a crime of violence or an otherwise serious offense."1 2 Because of its attachment to prison sentences, the
Commission did not implement this provision, but rather, it viewed it as a
problem." 3 It responded to the problem by creating "guidelines that classify as serious many offenses for which probation previously was frequently
given and provide[d] for at least a short term of imprisonment in such
cases."" 4 As a result, the "guidelines contain a presumptive sentence of
imprisonment for every felony in the United States Code."' 1 5 The Commission should reconsider this decision and expand the number of cases in
which probation is a guideline approved sentence.
Next, the Commission should systematically reduce the sentencing
ranges called for by the guidelines. Although the Commission should examine every guideline, it might begin with those that most frequently result in variances, for these are the guidelines that judges consider most
problematically harsh. Even though guideline advocates anticipated that
judicial responses would play an important part in guideline revisions, this
has not happened." 6 With a few exceptions, no guidelines have ever been

108.
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reduced.' 7 And as discussed, most guidelines are too harsh.1 1 8 Also, the
fact that judges do not vary from some guidelines does not mean that such
guidelines establish appropriate sentencing levels.' 19 If a guideline is not
manifestly excessive, judges will often defer to it. As stated, judges pay a lot
of attention to the guidelines, whether or not such attention is deserved.120
Reducing the severity of the guidelines would also advance the
Commission's goal of reducing inter-judge sentencing disparity. Judges
vary from the guidelines because they regard them as too severe. 12 1 If
judges regarded the guidelines as fair, they would follow them more often.
In other words, the Commission could achieve its goal of reducing interjudge disparity by improving the quality of its product, rather than by forcing its consumers, judges, to buy it.
In addition to revising the guidelines, the Commission should also
become an advocate for policies that will reduce the prison population.
Most importantly, it should argue forcefully for the repeal of mandatory
minimum sentences. Many federal defendants face charges carrying
mandatory minimums, including some 74 percent of defendants charged
with offenses involving crack cocaine.1 22 Most of these defendants are
small-time, street-level drug dealers for whom the mandated five or ten
year sentences are manifestly excessive.1 23 The Commission has issued an
excellent report on mandatory minimums1 24 but has not assumed a leadership role by speaking out and lobbying against them. Possibly, the Commission is reluctant to be political. Some of the most effective state
sentencing commissions, however, are those that have taken strong stands
and pushed for sensible results in the highly politicized world of criminal
justice. Commissions which function like interest groups are often more
117.
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successful than those that attempt to avoid politics but end up aggravating
the system's pathologically severe penalties. 12 5
The Commission should repeatedly argue that mandatory minimum
sentences are inflexible laws that undermine justice by preventing judges
from fixing suitable punishments that take into consideration both the offense conduct and the individual defendant. Alternatively, the Commission should urge Congress to expand the statutory safety valve which, as
currently constituted, allows defendants in some drug cases who meet certain criteria to escape mandatory sentences. 126 The problem is that the law
applies only to a small percentage of defendants charged with offenses carrying mandatory minimums. 127 The law could easily be expanded to apply
to cases other than those involving drugs and to defendants other than
those with minimal records. The safety valve reflects a desire to allow sentencing flexibility for some offenders. Such flexibility should be more
broadly available.
Finally, the Commission should promote legislation establishing a
procedure by which elderly prisoners who present no danger to the public
can be released. Corrections experts and criminologists generally agree
that when prisoners reach age fifty, they fall into the elderly category. 12 8
The ACLU finds that "[t]he lack of appropriate healthcare and access to
healthy living prior to incarceration, added to" the stress of prison life,
"accelerates the aging process."1 29 Between 13 and 14 percent of the federal prison population is presently over age fifty, and this population is
increasingly comprised of individuals serving very long sentences who remain in prison in their old age.1 30 Many of these prisoners would not pose
a threat to public safety if they were released.' ' When Congress enacted
the SRA and abolished parole, it eliminated the only effective mechanism
by which older prisoners could obtain release. The Commission needs to
convince Congress that it is time to create a new one. 132
125.
See Barkow, supra note 51, at 813.
126.
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127.
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129.
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130.
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THE COMMISSION SHOULD RETHINK INTER-JUDGE DISPARITY
AND REDUCE MASS INCARCERATION

I recognize that it will be very difficult for the Commission to
change its mission as I have suggested. In order to respond to the problem
of mass incarceration, the Commission will have to transcend its own history of creating harsh guidelines and continually increasing their severity.
The Commission will also have to change its thinking about inter-judge
sentencing disparity. I believe that the Commission should radically deemphasize this issue but, to the extent that it remains a concern, the Commission needs to approach it more thoughtfully. Rather than analyzing
why the number of below guideline sentences increases, the Commission
sometimes responds in a knee jerk fashion, as it did when it asked Congress to enact legislation giving greater heft to the guidelines.
This issue emerged at the Commission's February 16, 2012 hearing.
The Commission indicated that, in responding to the increase in below
guideline sentences, its choices were to seek legislation that restored
mandatory guidelines or that strengthened the advisory guidelines, and
that it chose the latter alternative. Mary Price, counsel for Families Against
Mandatory Minimums ("FAMM"), however, pointed out that there were
other alternatives, and that the Commission should have examined the reasons for the below guideline sentences before making its "unprecedented
request to Congress to stage . . . a legislative intervention." 3 3 She noted
the Commission's "lack of curiosity . . . about the causes of variances and

sources of disparity" and suggested that it explore "why judges believe the
criminal history guideline so frequently fails to account for. .. the defendant's actual prior criminality." 1 34
Price urged the Commission to go "behind the numbers

. . ."

to

better account "for the role of prosecutors," and to use "the tools and
authorities that you have . . . to improve troublesome sentencing
rules .... ."13 She testified that the guidelines were "deeply flawed .

riffed with sentences that are unduly long and severe, overly retributive not
proportionate and based on little or no empirical evidence of their inherent validity" and that judicial variances were a "barometer and not a problem."' 3 6 She asked the Commission:
to dig down; refuse to the take the data at face value; embrace
the feedback that you're getting; take stock of guidelines that
are causing variances; account for the role of other actors and
Look" and Other Sentence Reduction Provisions of the Model Penal Code: Sentencing Revision, 42 U.
TOL. L. REv. 859 (2011).
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, PUBLIC HEARING (2012) (testimony of Mary Price at
133.
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other rules in this system that might be driving disparity; and,
above all, don't do anything that's going to slow down or close
down the ability to hear what the courts think about the rules
that you write . . . but to go to Congress cold and say, this

problem is so severe that now we need your help. I found it
remarkable . . . - you started the ball rolling, but . . . [you]

might have rolled it in the wrong direction ... you presented a
lot of raw data to Congress, but there wasn't a lot of analysis. So
it doesn't help any of us understand, ... what's really going on
here.' 3 7
The questions that Price raised are profoundly important. Unfortunately, the Commission's response to Price's suggestions was less enthusiastic than one would have hoped. One commissioner defensively noted
that the congressional subcommittee to which the Commission had
presented its proposals had invited testimony from the Commission. 3 8
Another pointed out that the Commission had no authority over proseciitors but rather was tasked "with looking at the judicial branch," adding
that the Commission believed "that there are outlier sentences and that all
of us in this room can agree that there are outlier sentences."' 3 9 Sadly,
these comments indicate that the Commission continues to view its job as
policing judges who impose overly lenient sentences. Policing lenient
sentences, however, is not one of the Commission's statutory duties, nor
will it lead to improved sentencing.14 0
If the Commission continues to be concerned about inter-judge disparity, it must make a better effort to understand it. This means listening
to judges and treating below guideline sentences as critiques of the guidelines rather than as aberrant judicial conduct. The Commission should also
examine recent studies relating to the issue. Legal scholars are increasingly
skeptical that inter-judge disparity should be a matter of particular concern. For example, Professor Tiede, who recently completed a nationwide
study of sentencing in federal drug trafficking cases, concluded that if
judges are able "to exercise their discretion to fashion just sentences," any
resulting disparity "should be seen as a positive."' ' This is so, Tiede determined, because district judges are more qualified than Congress, have a lot
of sentencing experience, and will not necessarily abuse their discretion.14 2
Tiede also concluded that variations in district caseloads and practices, including prosecutorial charging practices, are so pervasive that it is essential
that judges have the discretion to tailor their sentencing practices in re137.
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sponse.1 43 Professor Shepherd, who also conducted a nationwide study of
sentencing practices, found a connection between expanded discretion and
a decrease in crime, concluding that "contrary to the expectations of many
of the original tough-on-crime supporters, the reduced discretion under
the guidelines is associated with increases in crime, not decreases."1 44
If, as I urge, the Commission decides to focus on reducing mass incarceration and pay less attention to inter-judge sentencing disparity, it
will no doubt be subject to criticism, including criticism from conservatives in the House of Representatives. But if the Commission Wishes to be
relevant to the sentencing problems of today, it will have no alternative but
to push back. Most students of crime and punishment agree that mass incarceration is the most serious criminal justice problem that we presently
face. And yet, because crime is such a sensitive political issue, few, if any,
elected officials are willing to talk about it, much less propose legislation to
change it. The Commission is ideally suited to address the issue. It is wellstaffed and need not worry about politics. In order to be effective, however, the Commission must approach its job in a way that it has not done
before. It must become both more enlightened and more assertive. It must
take major steps to reduce the federal prison population, and it must also
make clear to Congress that inter-judge sentencing disparity is far from the
most serious sentencing issue we face. To the extent that it is a problem,
the most effective way to address it is to reduce the severity of the guidelines so that they are in greater conformity with the reasoned opinion of
judges and jurors.
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